This is the prompt I’ve been waiting for, no longer dealing with nebulous IR theories, we’ve finally settled down on a specific policy question with real world debate about this very issue going on as we speak. But, in addition to being my favorite, it is also the most difficult; I must admit to being conflicted on this issue. I don’t know what I would do if I were President. On one hand, Rowland makes a compelling argument for the necessity of staying (though, he intentionally neglects the human right argument, which I find to be strange considering it is one of his strongest arguments); but on the other hand you have the train of thought that says we can deal with the consequences and it would in fact be better for our security to withdraw. That said, I’m going to argue a position I don’t necessarily agree with 100% but I think makes a compelling overall argument. I’m not a huge fan of bullet pointing/numbering my points on an essay, but I think it suits this format. So, without further delay, here are five reasons that continuing to prosecute the Afghan War as it stands now, will be damaging to our collective long term security. Considering that the prompt and the question of “Should we be in Afghanistan” are closely related for the rational thinking, some of my points will address the latter more directly.
The most important reason is that the War may not, in fact, actually be making us safer because whatever security gains it reaps is offset by the increase in the number of our enemies. For example, on September 10, 2001 our main enemy in Afghanistan with the potential to strike outside the borders of that country as al-Qaeda; now, we face not only al-Qaeda but also various other organizations which have decided to make war upon us in retaliation for our attacking them for harboring al-Qaeda. Specifically, we now find that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is interested in striking at US cities and even tried as much with Faisal Shazad, the failed Times Square Bomber. We are helping to create more and more enemies with heavy handed military interventions. But how? It’s complicated, but it has roots in Pashtunwali – the tribal code of the Pashtun people. Per this code, it is incumbent upon a home owner to offer shelter, and aid and comfort to any guest or defeated enemy in battle, this practice is known as Melmastia with a little bit of Nanawata, the former being hospitality to guests and the latter asylum for a defeated enemy.
After the defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda suffered in October 2001, they crossed over the border into Pakistan and made use not only of the long standing alliances they had with the people (dating back to the 1980’s with the al-Ansar guest houses and such) but also the tribal custom that required them to provide aid and comfort to the beaten, bloodied and defeated Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants. The ensuing 9 years of relentless American bombardment, often failing to distinguish the Taliban/AQ members from their hosts (as was the point, remember?) helped to drive the two together and forge an alliance. In the aftermath of the Red Mosque siege of 2008, numerous disaffected Pashtun militant groups banded together to start the TTP and immediately began to wage war on the Pakistani state and Afghan/ISAF forces in Afghanistan.
It is also interesting to note that groups like the TTP and Haqqani Network (another militant group straddling the Durand Line) don’t necessarily have a lot of contact with the Quetta Shura Taliban (what most people mean when they say “Taliban” which is translated merely as “students”). The QS Taliban is based in Baluchistan while the TTP, Haqqanis and other militant groups are based in North Waziristan. Damage done to the QS Taliban does not translate to damage done to the TTP or others. Note that the QS Taliban has not actually taken any offensive terrorist actions against the United States, nor do they show any intention to. They are not currently any threat to the US homeland, yet we are spending hundreds of billions to fight them with several hundred thousand US troops. The groups that do pose a threat to the US Homeland are being fought with Special Operations Forces, drone strikes and the Pakistani military, all at a far lesser cost to the US in terms of blood and treasure. So, riddle me this: If the 100,000 US troops there are only fighting a domestic insurgency with no threat to the US homeland, how does that make us safer? The real threat to the homeland seems to be from the lawless border line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that seems to be managed with drone strikes, SOF operators and domestic police and intelligence regimes.
But oh yes, the safe haven argument. This continues to perplex me because to believe it, we must suspend reality. The argument goes that we cannot leave Afghanistan because the Taliban will topple Kabul and again provide shelter to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups who will then use Afghanistan as a launching pad for another 9/11. A compelling argument, I admit and one with a solid historical basis. The QS Taliban and al-Qaeda continue to cooperate and reinforce each other and wouldn’t it make sense that they would return to the good old days of 1996 once we were gone? Perhaps, but perhaps not.
First, we must deal with the implications of the aforementioned safe haven being reestablished. This is not the doomsday scenario that most make it out to be. Firstly, we already have safe havens all over the world – nearly all of Yemen and Somalia is outside of the control of their respective governments, as well is most of Afghanistan to be honest and so is most of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Terrorism is not a numbers game, and it is not a matter of territory, no matter how much we may try to make it out to be. The Red Brigades in Europe managed to wreak havoc with no safe havens and little domestic support. A terrorism campaign is not the same as an insurgency, and we need to stop conflating the two. The latter requires territory and popular support and the former does not. The safe haven argument is also outdated – based on an old model of al-Qaeda terrorism that hasn’t been used since 9/11 – expeditionary terrorism. Safe havens only work if you use them to train and then send terrorist abroad. But despite having numerous safe havens already, al-Qaeda has not tried this tactic since 9/11, preferring to outsource it to international branches, domestic allies in Pakistan or self-starting Jihadis, none of which depend on using Afghanistan as a safe haven. As we have already seen, our enemies are perfectly capable of trying to attack us without the use of Afghanistan.
All that’s not to say that withdrawing from Afghanistan wouldn’t have serious consequences and for the US and our allies: there would certainly be a very bloody civil war between the Afghan government with re-armed tribal allies in the north against the resurgent Pashtuns in the south. The oppression of women would continue, only much more severe. Human rights violations would be widespread and it is entirely possible that al-Qaeda would be able to use the territory as a launching pad. Our inglorious retreat would also be a huge boon to al-Qaeda’s media and propaganda efforts by painting itself as having defeated America and protected the holy lands of Islam from yet another invader – this would be a huge opportunity for al-Qaeda to paint itself as a legitimate defender of Muslim lands as opposed to the terrorist group it is now. Al-Qaeda has had no successes in its efforts to topple apostate Muslim ruler or to expel the “crusaders” from the lands of Islam, this would be its first “victory”.
But on the other hand, aren’t all of these manageable? The argument never was that the consequences wouldn’t be dire, but that they were worth it and we could handle the after effects. The war and bloodshed would be regrettable but it seems that whatever happens, Afghanistan is in for a very bloody future in any case. The repression of women is another horrible but inevitable event, even the Kabul government we support so has curtailed and oppressed women. The launching pad argument has already been addressed and since when has al-Qaeda propaganda been constrained by reality? Withdrawing so many troops was also painted as a victory for the Islamic State of Iraq but that was no big boon to business for them; they gained no legitimacy and no huge recruiting boost. Al-Qaeda may claim it, but that doesn’t make it so – plus I hazard that not many people would be joining up to kill Americans as they retreated from Islamic lands. So far it appears to have been our presence there that radicalized most people; somehow I doubt our leaving would have the same effect.
So far from what I can tell, our presence in Afghanistan is not directly serving our security interests and is instead increasing Jihadi recruitment, radicalizing more groups against us, costing us hundreds of billions of dollars in what seems to be a failing effort and is a huge military commitment in an era when the center of world power is moving away from the storied pomp of these ancient lands and instead moving to Asia and the South Pacific. Al-Qaeda isn’t the military’s war -- it’s a job for intelligence agencies and the police.
Al-Qaeda can be contained, managed and even defeated without a deployment of 100,000 troops. Paradoxically, withdrawing these troops might be one of the preconditions for overall victory. During the Second Punic War, Roman General Fabius Maximus refrained from attacking Hannibal directly, instead focusing on harassing and targeted attacks. Hannibal, like al-Qaeda, fed on victories and needed the prestige and support they brought him. Without victories, Hannibal was unable to convince the government in Carthage to support him and he eventually withdrew for lack of support. Without a successful attack, or an inflammatory act by the West, al-Qaeda would be starved of the propaganda it so desires and would be starved of legitimacy and recruits. Al-Qaeda is only as successful as the world and the ummah perceives it to be.
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