Throughout this class, we have focused on three different lenses through which political scientists view and interpret state actions: constructivism, realism and liberalism. But of course, this raises the question, does asserting one of these mean you do so to the exclusion of the other two? The answer, like so much in life, is a mix.
Once upon a time, I had an ethics teacher (if one can teach ethics) who posed a question to class: what is it always, under every circumstance can everyone agree is wrong to do? The answer is: nothing. There are almost no black and white issues in the world today, especially in the field of international affairs. For example, when handed the prompt in class on Tuesday I complained to PTJ about having to argue against an idea I agreed with. But after exploring and developing a counter-argument to the constructivist notion, I found myself actually supporting the liberal argument. But I still think the constructivist notion has substantial merit.
So, I would posit that all views have varying degrees of merit depending on the situation. Sometimes an issue can be as black and white as 99% realist but still 1% constructivist. So, an honest and unbiased observer would be able to see the various facets of the situation and how they apply to each theory. Some people will, of course, only see certain sides of an issue but taking a step back should reveal that all views have something to offer. That said, constructivism is just plain silly.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Mai Theeries R Rite
International relations is a uniquely interesting field of academia due to its holistic approach to the world. Various schools of thought attempt to formulate ideas as to why the world exists, behaves, and is shaped the way it is. Determining which school of thought to use within real world policy can be an arduous task.
Realism, liberalism, and constructivism all provide different explanations as to how our world interacts. Policies governments enact can be interpreted as being based upon a specific school of thought. For example, enacting a missile defense system in eastern Europe could be seen as realist since nations can't be sure what Russia's intentions are in the reason. A missile defense system could deter the potential risk of Russian aggression and would be in our nation's national security interest to enact this system. The example can be used as the basis of another question: are theories the basis of policies or do theories emerge from policies?
I believe that both options provide some level of truth. Sticking with realism, since we can't ever be entirely sure what the intentions of another nation are, policies are sometimes enacted in a precautionary manner. Something that has the chance of improving relations, fiscal status, etc., is better off than the risk of the inverse. I think this shows that there can be some level of theory as the basis of policy. Whether one theory is better/used more than others can be dependent on the situation, who's enacting what policy, or the more likely answer, it's indeterminable. Policy does require some detachment from theory due to the importance of falsifiable action that can be required. Theories can cause policy paralysis as different schools of thought argue over the "best course of action" based upon their beliefs. One school of thought being "more accurate" than the others doesn't necessarily disprove other theories. Theories are based upon the compilation of historical events and a specific trend of principle that can be isolated within that period of time. That being said, history is currently occurring and is constantly changing, theories that are strong now could be disproved, weaken, or even be eliminated. A main example of this is the introduction of nuclear weapons. In a previous post I explained how the introduction of mutually assured destruction radically altered IR theory. Nation-states now had to interact with the knowledge that states were capable of virtually eliminating their existence with the atomic bomb. This allowed for various facets of realism to arise and strengthened and weakened other theories.
In the end, determining one theory over the other is a endless process with potentially no end in sight. Learning about these theories and their real world relevance is what's important is our understanding of them.
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Clashing Theories
The discussion of determining which international relations theory is correct and which are false is a waste of time. Like anything that contradicts another thing, a common ground cannot be found without compromising the essence of each theory. Religion is a perfect example. Two contradicting religions cannot be practiced by one person, because religious principles are stated in truths, and when these do not coincide a person cannot practice both religions without breaking the spiritual understanding of each religion respectively. To be more specific, Christians base their faith on the belief that Jesus, whom they believe is God’s son, came to earth and died so that believers could be granted forgiveness from their sins and, upon death, be accepted into eternal life in heaven. Hinduism is based on the recognition of Brahman, a three-in-one god, and the principle of reincarnation. The ultimate goal is to eventually reach Nirvana, the end of their reincarnation journey. Christians believe that one must believe in Jesus in order to receive everlasting life and since the Hindu religion does not acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, it is impossible for Hindus to enter heaven. Another even more stark contradiction to both above mentioned religions is atheism. Aligning oneself with a religion that states the belief in a higher, holy power directly contradicts with the belief that no higher power exists.
Similarly, it is impossible to decide which IR theory is correct. All theories are subject to each individuals opinions and perspectives. Although there may be overlapping qualities in the theories, or there may be grey areas in which multiple theories seem applicable or no theories seem applicable, each stands on its own, unable to be meshed with the other theories. Individuals must decide for themselves as to which theory they find more applicable to world politics.
It's all in theory (but not really)
The blog question for this week is a really interesting one. The way Professor Jackson words the question, he implies that it's important to define an entity using a theory of international relations. On the contrary, I think the guest speaker from Wednesday, Dr. Howard, made it seem as though explaining something through theory is inconsequential compared to actually dealing with the situation or organization at hand.
However, if you are determined to focus on the theories and schools of thought behind the issues, you have to accept differences between explanations as unavoidable. It is up to the individual to decide which explanation they feel is most likely. There is also the possibility that the real answer is a combination of the answers produced by different schools of thought. People and countries rarely do anything for just one reason.
Also, the question " If one perspective is accurate, does this necessarily mean that the others are wrong?" is very confusing to me. How could we ever know for certain that one perspective is accurate? The intersubjectivity that Wendt loves so much assures that we can never be certain. But, if you could prove for certain that a perspective was accurate, it would not make other perspectives wrong. It can be compared to viewing a statue from different points in a room. One person might say "that is a statue of the front of a man" and another might say "it is a statue of the back of a man", but only a person that has traveled around the room and looked at the statue from different points can say "it is a statue of a whole man." However, all three people would technically be right.
However, if you are determined to focus on the theories and schools of thought behind the issues, you have to accept differences between explanations as unavoidable. It is up to the individual to decide which explanation they feel is most likely. There is also the possibility that the real answer is a combination of the answers produced by different schools of thought. People and countries rarely do anything for just one reason.
Also, the question " If one perspective is accurate, does this necessarily mean that the others are wrong?" is very confusing to me. How could we ever know for certain that one perspective is accurate? The intersubjectivity that Wendt loves so much assures that we can never be certain. But, if you could prove for certain that a perspective was accurate, it would not make other perspectives wrong. It can be compared to viewing a statue from different points in a room. One person might say "that is a statue of the front of a man" and another might say "it is a statue of the back of a man", but only a person that has traveled around the room and looked at the statue from different points can say "it is a statue of a whole man." However, all three people would technically be right.
Monday, September 27, 2010
A Fear-driven French Identity
This weeks trip to the French Embassy was perfectly applicable to class. I really enjoyed the relevance because I was able to apply the theoretical aspect of identity that was discussed in class to the specifics of French identity. The French diplomat addressed the French idea of identity: French first, everything else second.
Since visiting the embassy, I have read several articles about the recent actions of the French government, specifically the controversial actions of the French Parliament’s ban on the wearing of burqas and President Sarkozy’s law to remove the Roma from their camps. Both actions, though carried out by separate bodies within the governmental system, reiterate a fear-driven mentality to maintain a pure French identity. Whereas the United States was founded by immigrants and has, generally speaking, been rather welcoming of immigrants through its history, France has historically been much less tolerant of meshing cultures. Banning the wearing of burqas is a perfect example of French assimilation and the erasing of previous identity to become solely French. This video news report (http://online.wsj.com/video/french-parliament-backs-veil-ban/C6F48A08-7B76-4422-8458-FCFA5D92D7B7.html) states that in addition to being fined if caught wearing a burqa, attending French citizenship classes may also be required. Is this legislation passed out of fear or hatred? Its hard to say. However, I think that the French government fears it may lose its identity to the new European identity officially defined by the establishment of the European Union (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703376504575492011925494780.html).
President Sarkozy’s dedication to destroying the Roma camps and deporting the Roma from France, seems to be yet another means of protecting the French identity. Sarkozy blames the Roma for acts of violence and other criminal acts, such as trafficking. Instead of addressing the issues within the Roma population, Sarkozy has chosen to further the issue of human rights violations by ruthlessly destroying the lively hood of thousands of individuals (http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGPRE201009131861&lang=e, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11243923).
Where should the line be drawn? Is identity what a population is comprised of or what a government molds the population to become? I think that the answers to these questions depend of the type of government that is ruling a country. In America, individuals can, for the most part, practice any religion, wear any clothing, speak any language, etc. This attracts many immigrants looking for a place to fit in and succeed. Many countries, however, have governments that forbid any type of personal of public identity that is not sanctioned by the government (i.e. China).
Though identity can be a complex aspect of international relations, it is vital. How world leaders, populations, governments, and organizations view themselves and other countries, is essential to how each actor will interact with all the “others” that exist in the international venue.
The Pledge of Allegiance is Fascist and Creepy
I know many people totally disagree with me, but I really do think that making kids say the pledge of allegiance is really creepy and kind of fascist. It seems eerily similar to indoctrination. I was talking with Holly and Artina, and they made a really good point. Why were we expected to pledge every day? Isn't once enough? How many times do children have to pledge themselves to a country before the government believes they mean it?
Also, I really think that if we have to pledge to anything, it should be to the human race or to the planet earth. Seriously, the kind of nationalism that no one thinks about- like saying the pledge every day- is the kind that scares me the most. Dr. Lawrence Britt (although I can't say anything about his credibility; he could be a crazy for all I know) outlined the fourteen defining characteristics of fascism, and the first one is,
PS, I know this is really heated, so I know I'm setting myself up to get flaming comments. Say what you like.
Also, I really think that if we have to pledge to anything, it should be to the human race or to the planet earth. Seriously, the kind of nationalism that no one thinks about- like saying the pledge every day- is the kind that scares me the most. Dr. Lawrence Britt (although I can't say anything about his credibility; he could be a crazy for all I know) outlined the fourteen defining characteristics of fascism, and the first one is,
"Powerful and Continuing Nationalism - Fascist regimes tend to make constant use of patriotic mottos, slogans, symbols, songs, and other paraphernalia. Flags are seen everywhere, as are flag symbols on clothing and in public displays."Sound familiar? I'm not implying that the American Government is fascist or anything; it's just something to think about.
PS, I know this is really heated, so I know I'm setting myself up to get flaming comments. Say what you like.
Sunday, September 26, 2010
Week 5 Reflection (9/20-9/24)
This was, I admit, one of the more challenging weeks in WP as of yet. The main reason for this, I believe, is the fact that I'm not much of a constructivist. Oh sure, I think they're right about some things but as my blog posts indicates, I'm don't buy into their whole system. That made Wendt's already incomprehensible reading, even more dreadful. And let me just address that for a moment, actually:
There's such a thing as writing in a coherent fashion for a specific audience and in such a manner that you communicate your point clearly, and there's such a thing as writing a piece that is deliberately obtuse and incomprehensible to the layman. Maybe, and I'm not ruling this out, I'm just not too smart but it seemed to me that Wendt was nearly incoherent. I would read whole paragraphs and not understand a single sentence. While I eventually got the main point from the reading, it was a painful slog.
The visit to the French Embassy was more interesting, but did suffer from a few flaws I thought. Firstly, I just didn't think the diplomat who presented to us was particularly exciting. I liked the tour but it was hotter 'n heck outside and I wanted to retreat to the AC when the guide said, "oh, it's so nice. Let's do all the tour out here!" Thankfully, the other guide saved us. Also, waiting 45 minutes for the bus was a slight pain in the derriere. Toby had an interesting question about the recent abduction of French nationals by members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the recent involvement of the French Military in strikes against AQIM. But, unfortunately, the diplomat refused comment.
The new discussion format in class was certainly interesting, but I did not like it overall. While it was surprisingly successful in self regulating, I still believe it would inevitably break down as it did toward the end. Plus, as PTJ predicted, some of the quieter members of the class who may have had valid points, were not heard. So, I admit, this was not my favorite week. But with the interesting lab on Wednesday (in the Formal Lounge!) and seemingly good readings lined up, I'm excited for next week being much more enjoyable.
There's such a thing as writing in a coherent fashion for a specific audience and in such a manner that you communicate your point clearly, and there's such a thing as writing a piece that is deliberately obtuse and incomprehensible to the layman. Maybe, and I'm not ruling this out, I'm just not too smart but it seemed to me that Wendt was nearly incoherent. I would read whole paragraphs and not understand a single sentence. While I eventually got the main point from the reading, it was a painful slog.
The visit to the French Embassy was more interesting, but did suffer from a few flaws I thought. Firstly, I just didn't think the diplomat who presented to us was particularly exciting. I liked the tour but it was hotter 'n heck outside and I wanted to retreat to the AC when the guide said, "oh, it's so nice. Let's do all the tour out here!" Thankfully, the other guide saved us. Also, waiting 45 minutes for the bus was a slight pain in the derriere. Toby had an interesting question about the recent abduction of French nationals by members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the recent involvement of the French Military in strikes against AQIM. But, unfortunately, the diplomat refused comment.
The new discussion format in class was certainly interesting, but I did not like it overall. While it was surprisingly successful in self regulating, I still believe it would inevitably break down as it did toward the end. Plus, as PTJ predicted, some of the quieter members of the class who may have had valid points, were not heard. So, I admit, this was not my favorite week. But with the interesting lab on Wednesday (in the Formal Lounge!) and seemingly good readings lined up, I'm excited for next week being much more enjoyable.
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Reflection 5 - Need...Moar...Lolcatzz
This week consisted of constructivism, a visit to the French Embassy, and a discussion of identity via our relationship with immigrants/foreigners. The discussion that resonated with me the most was how immigration is to the U.S. is framed. We watched numerous videos in class that showed attitudes toward immigration ranging from drivers license tests being required in English to the "natural beauty" of America. These attitudes towards people not native to America were discussed in class but I feel that there is a larger importance to these attitudes.
How we approach immigrants is unique. Generally, we acknowledge differences between us, Americans, and them, the foreigners. This dichotomy that's established reinforces structural stereotypes that exist in the status quo. For example, in the "Welcome to America" clip, many stereotypes and techniques were used to differentiate between America and foreigners. Clips of foreigners were juxtaposed with clips of white Americans. Additionally, the clips of the foreigners were of them in their native garments, reinforcing their clear difference from Americans. While the intention of the video may not have been to establish us-them dichotomies, the assumptions behind the video are uniquely flawed. While the United States prides itself in being a melting pot nation, flawed representations and forms of securitization consistently occur. Tightening on immigration laws are an example of the U.S. securitizing against the threat of the immigrant. While these issues weren't entirely fleshed out in class, it seems that the representations we see via Youtube videos and media, can potentially have a larger impact on nation-state policies.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
States and Social Norms
If you were to ask a realist about what constrains state action, he would likely say "not much, except the sense of self preservation preventing the state from intentionally provoking a war it does not want". With no super-national authority, with the international system in a state of "anarchy," what does constrain a states action? Anything? Certainly, one can say there are things states should not do, but without any form of higher authority to challenge it, what's to prevent the state from doing that? Is an unenforced rule still a rule?
We have evolved in such a manner that Western Enlightenment values are considered the most desirable and the democratic system pervades in all the major centers of power in the world, and even where they aren't and it doesn't, there is still at least some respect for the values (mostly). So, one can say fairly conclusively that every society has social norms regarding the role of government, and the international system even has a set of norms that is fairly widely agreed upon. We, all being Americans who, for the purposes of this discussion, all subscribe to Enlightenment values, can agree on at least a basic set of rules to govern the international system: states should not kill their own citizens without just cause, states should not aggressively and unprovoked make war on other states, states should not silence dissent, states should productively participate in the international system, states should have free and fair elections...
But, as even the most obtuse international observer can tell you, this is not the case. States kill their own citizens without cause all the time, states often make war on other states (See the August War most recently), states often silence dissent and so on and so forth. So, if these norms are regularly violated, are they really rules? Well, yes - to a degree. One could argue that these American values don't exist in these countries but look above: how many of these are really unique to America and western liberal democracies? Maybe one or two.
So then, are states ever constrained by these norms? Well, yes but only when such social norms are enforced by force. Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait because they were violating international norms, they did it because nearly a million allied troops threw them out by force. Do social norms prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea, or is it the 2 Carrier Battle Groups parked off their shoreline? Did Noriega turn himself on peaceably, or did US troops drag him to court? Did South Africa give up apartheid and it's nuclear program because it was feeling generous, or was it the heavy international pressure and sanctions?
We would all like to live in a world where states act in a reasonable way and are constrained by some non-violent super-national authority and they would choose to be a productive member of the international system, with coercion. Unfortunately, as we can so often see, that is not the case. Do social norms sometimes dictate state action? Yes, but not often. And when it does, it is generally because the states know there will be violent retaliation for their violation (sometimes). Self interest plays a far greater role in why states do what they do than a nebulous set of social norms.
We have evolved in such a manner that Western Enlightenment values are considered the most desirable and the democratic system pervades in all the major centers of power in the world, and even where they aren't and it doesn't, there is still at least some respect for the values (mostly). So, one can say fairly conclusively that every society has social norms regarding the role of government, and the international system even has a set of norms that is fairly widely agreed upon. We, all being Americans who, for the purposes of this discussion, all subscribe to Enlightenment values, can agree on at least a basic set of rules to govern the international system: states should not kill their own citizens without just cause, states should not aggressively and unprovoked make war on other states, states should not silence dissent, states should productively participate in the international system, states should have free and fair elections...
But, as even the most obtuse international observer can tell you, this is not the case. States kill their own citizens without cause all the time, states often make war on other states (See the August War most recently), states often silence dissent and so on and so forth. So, if these norms are regularly violated, are they really rules? Well, yes - to a degree. One could argue that these American values don't exist in these countries but look above: how many of these are really unique to America and western liberal democracies? Maybe one or two.
So then, are states ever constrained by these norms? Well, yes but only when such social norms are enforced by force. Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait because they were violating international norms, they did it because nearly a million allied troops threw them out by force. Do social norms prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea, or is it the 2 Carrier Battle Groups parked off their shoreline? Did Noriega turn himself on peaceably, or did US troops drag him to court? Did South Africa give up apartheid and it's nuclear program because it was feeling generous, or was it the heavy international pressure and sanctions?
We would all like to live in a world where states act in a reasonable way and are constrained by some non-violent super-national authority and they would choose to be a productive member of the international system, with coercion. Unfortunately, as we can so often see, that is not the case. Do social norms sometimes dictate state action? Yes, but not often. And when it does, it is generally because the states know there will be violent retaliation for their violation (sometimes). Self interest plays a far greater role in why states do what they do than a nebulous set of social norms.
Blog 5
Government has existed as many different things in many different places throughout history. After acknowledging this fact, it is hard to discern what norms exist for governmental powers and actions. In America, the U.S. government is expected to remain, for the most part, out of individual affairs whereas, in other countries the governments may have established a norm of quite the reverse.
Despite these differences, however, a global norm of morals does exist. It is not acceptable for states to commit acts of moral injustice (i.e. genocides, murder, any human rights violation, etc.) and this expectation is held to standards made by the U.N. and other institutions. Unfortunately, this moral code is often breeched by nations on the road to power and self-interest. The blog question poses that there are either limiting social expectations, or all norms are reducible by those hungry for power. Both are applicable. Yes, there are social norms and expectations for the state, but everything is and has been overridden by governments thirsting for power. Just like the norms for a professor (cannot touch students, cannot physically, emotionally or sexually abuse students, etc.) can and have been breeched, global norms are often breeched as well. In the case of a professor, a violator of any major norm will result in a loss of the teaching position, and thus a loss of power. Similarly, a state that breeches the moral code is often approached by the U.N., often occupied or attacked, and in a sense losses some of its power as well.
On a personal and individual level, social norms are very powerful. Unfortunately, states are not worried about embarrassing themselves, or disrupting class when their phone rings. As realists often point out, states, especially developing states, have a thirst for power and will do anything to quench that thirst.
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